Payback to society or not . . . for the derivatives trades and unscrupulous behavior. This is a scenario we’ve persistently warned wasn’t limited to any single firm; wouldn’t stop at the doorsteps of the banks, brokers or even the rating agencies; and that is very pertinent even now.. the majority of the “toxic debt” to this day remains not unwound.

What Friday’s civil challenges against Goldman, in a market ripe for a breather (as of course we believed) proves, is that the challenges of the “epic debacle,” plus residual impacts, are not over. As to culpability: we contended that the “fix was in,” before the epic debacle collapsed, when there was denial of a problem by both Wall Street and the government, way back when we warned of implications of more than one firm in denial (still masking) what was going on, before Lehman; before Bear Stearns, and of course before the Fed even acknowledged the problem. After our first warning of the “liquidity crisis” and “credit crunch” risk in early February of 2007, we escalated that in the Spring of 2007 to an “epic debacle” call, because we saw firms from a small one in Irvine, all the way up to Citigroup, destroyed or risking restructuring due to net capital deficiencies.

All along, officials denied the whole affair; while the Federal Register proves what we contended, and that there was awareness (the first of the “waivers” we alluded to was noted as from the Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board to Citigroup’s CFO, by the way), as that allowed circumventing the very firewalls intended to protect, in the wake of the Clinton Administration signing-off on repeal of Glass Steagall. Friday’s action is unimpressive taken alone, aside from the government shooting at a high target, although they acknowledge within the disclosed emails, that GS knew the implications of their debt monstrosities. It can’t be all brought down on one 31-year-old VP, unless that too is a part of cover-ups. Perhaps they’re afraid bringing truth forth would create new panic.

Just the other day we noted it might take a whole generation to get leaders that have no tie to this particular era, but that’s not our purpose in these remarks. Rather, it’s to focus on market behavior and a probability that there will be a “wider net” cast before this matter comes to rest. Many analysts were paraded in the media to proclaim just another “buying opportunity,” something we dispute other than interim rebounds that of course will occur, especially when investors press the downside into weakness. At the same time like I noted intraday in calling for a rebound; it would be false, abortive, and the primary corrective downtrend evolves (or primary resumption if that is how it all settles, which we strongly suspect, but it will not all structure itself in one swoop). I also note that where intelligent “structured finance” experts appear, their observations tend to be muted, or reduced to “shallow” comments, lest that too reveal current risks.

Goldman is claiming they lost 90 million dollars on the deal in question. That’s not the issue; the issue is far broader, as you’ll hear from plenty of lawyers close to the story. The typical contention will be that the buyers of the structured products were aware of the risky nature of the investment, and in some cases that’s true, but generally not so or the offloading of risk would have gone far afield what you’ve heard about today. Lloyd’s of London comes to mind as just one entity with investors who clearly weren’t so sophisticated as to comprehend structured derivatives or their inherent risk matrix (if you know the Lloyd’s, or other “pool” structures, you realize limits of due diligence).

Speaking of offloading risk . . a cottage industry has developed regarding of course who or what might be next, whether or not Goldman Sachs “shorted” the S&P in-size ahead of this morning’s news; and whether or not they had advance notice of the Government’s move (no idea about such rumors, and that clearly is not the point).

As to trading, it’s not unusual for financiers to be long a tranche while short another, but there are lots of loopholes that defy interpretation in at least an easy manner. Nor is that pertinent here; we’re not attempting to judge any parties or counterparties, but believed all along that facts affirm the public general perception that there is and was material involvement in issues or misrepresentation by any number of professionals as to the recognized risk in all those instruments that contributed to history’s biggest toxic debt mess, as forecast in advance back in 2007. Further, that such knowledge has significance, whether or not profits or losses occurred, and whether or not even real estate burst. That it did opened a kettle of fish, but the kettle and distortion of evaluations of the merit and risk of the paper, was the issue even pre-catastrophe.

After the decline of 2007-2008, we argued that an interim 2009 rebound would occur (one of history’s greatest, considering misdirection of funds to enable trader recovery in the industry, more so than that of the citizens or small businessmen of our Nation), but that one must not presume said rebound to be anything but cyclical in nature. As we now set-up just the initial phase of corrective action, do expect pundits and others to try to convince everyone that nothing is a big deal; and that onward and upward is the next course. This is what they did in the initial stages of 2007-2008’s declines as well; and now (after post mortem books on the subject enlightened many investors, of course), you’ll have those who say Friday’s news has nothing to do with the market, going forward. They’ll try to make it appear thusly; but if this follows historic patterns, it will only allow for periodic reprieves, as will be chronicled again only after-the-fact. Friday’s events are less likely a one-off; more likely part of a tentative reform trend.

Once harm has been done, even a fool understands it. –Homer, Iliad XVII

Daily action . . . (a segment provided nightly to our regular readers) suspects that the coming week will evidence Friday SEC/Goldman saga as not a one-day wonder; but suggests that there will be washouts and then a rebound effort, especially if we see Sunday night weakness in Asian or European markets. Incidentally, what’s becoming history’s biggest volcanic cloud over Europe has economic implications, too, and beyond the airline industry. In the event the eruptions continue for months rather than days or weeks, the financial pressures on the UK and EU will mount; that in an indirect sense can affect lots of things (inhalation from silica, as confirmed by a radiation oncologist and ingerletter.com member, can cause lung cancer, not at this point noted in mass media). Summer tourism, agriculture and inflation, or availability of particular goods could be impacted, all of which are very much pending. Too soon to draw projections of that magnitude; but clearly intensification of the Icelandic volcano points in the direction of it too not being a short-term only event. Much will depend on how quickly an ice cap contributing to it reaching upper atmosphere levels dissipates. In tonight’s (members only) video I’ll outline the probable stock market pattern for the week just ahead; so for now I will share a few key comments of the week just past.

A “fireball” from outer space disturbed the Midwest calm (last week), massively exploding across the skies from Iowa through Illinois to Wisconsin and Indiana. The Earth shook in some areas as the presumed meteor shower surprised residents. It’s interesting how a fairly normal entry of known particle factors into the atmosphere is able to have unanticipated results. So too may be the trail of gases and meteorites (fragments of assets) as follow the forthcoming market retracement, occurring more like a “bolt out of the blue” to those only now suggesting stocks doubling after they already doubled (ridiculous risk being advocated by some after a solid upward move) as of course they’ll emphasize how “nobody” could have foreseen it (Thursday Daily).

As friction heats the forthcoming decline as belated high-level buyers scramble to find a smooth exit from leveraged positions they assumed without a care in the world with respect to orderly asset management criteria, there will initially be a calm reception to what the most bullish managers would allow is an “overdue” nominal correction. Only, it seems if an “event” occurs, or after a first rebound or two flail and fail, will a majority of participants become reticent, and will the odds for a fiery decline become visible. If it goes thusly, by then a smooth exodus will be tricky, as sellers fleeing keyhole exits are likely to be the dominant feature… interesting picture as they squeeze through.

Look closely at the goods in the current market environment and consider why some pundits are cheering-on advancing prices and advocating new investor buying (quite different that merely averaging-up on winning positions) by suggesting higher prices it seems, irrespective of historical experience. We don’t want to get hysterical about the odds of decline, and evolution may take some time, but this is overdue for a setback.

Fantastic (fairly likely) . . . midweek upward continuation patterns ahead of just a nominal Expiration, have met with a chorus of accolades and optimism from analysts; not to mention a Fed ‘tan (beige) book’ report suggesting broad economic gains over most Fed districts. Amidst the celebratory environment in which many analysts fearful of disaster a year ago are now ‘upgrading’ already-advanced stocks and estimates (a typical pattern as they cave-in to optimism in an extended market) we recalled (on Wed.) one American humorist’s remark, that will be appropriate in the months ahead:

“Feeling good about government is like looking on the bright side of any catastrophe. When you quit looking on the bright side, the catastrophe is still there.” — P. J. O’Rourke, (1947- ), US humorist, journalist, & political commentator

The catastrophe is two-fold: a) if the economy really is improving dramatically (not, but perception is important), then the rate market and oil prices suggest the same as private funds gravitating to replace the Fed in buying Agency securities hints at a shift a bit away from equities and bonds, and look for slightly competitive yields elsewhere at this point; while b) whether the improvement is valid by today’s equity valuations (we suspect not), there’s little doubt that structured derivatives are generally not yet unwound to any great extent; hence there is little wiggle room as the Government for sure tries to “thread a needle” to convince Americans we’re coming out of the woods.

Some clusters of trees are healthier in this forest; others are actually deteriorating. In fact if the debt morass were to be viewed by satellite (or could be displayed on the Google Earth application, and for all we know it probably can be), investors would for sure realize the challenges that face us front-and-center. Besides the state budgets of course, there are other unaddressed issues, including what impact defaults which may occur in certain communities have upon the municipal bond market (here and there, not widely), as well as what happens if the stock market craters concurrently with a realization that municipal (or even state pension defaults) are on the agenda.

All this is conveniently overlooked because of the day-to-day enthusiasm, which isn’t a surprise any more than it’s really a trifecta of good news in this Expiration week. In fact we knew this was a prospect given the psychological desire (no more than that) to have a solid close above S&P 1200, which will not be held before this show’s over.

Overseas we are not finished with challenges. The spreads widened again in Europe just today, and though not widely reported, this suggests the perceived Greek big fat rescue wedding with the IMF & EU might just be headed towards a sort of annulling; at the same time, spreads in Spain, Italy and Portugal also suggest new tensions in the offing. So by no means do we embrace the prevailing view of the crisis as over. (Next week I’ll explore a bit regarding shocking and unreported Money Supply shifts.)

Against this backdrop, and our willingness to look at the other side of the coin, we do express optimism about the future of the United States; as often said looking forward to actual prosperity between [redacted], stating that even before the “epic debacle” in fact fully folded, with an earlier market low. We need political leadership as might be foreseeable, along with trade policies that make progress achievable it should be emphasized, irrespective of the incredible challenges debt pictures provide us. In this regard, another quote comes to mind (although he then had the personal power to influence the future, and often did as history recorded in an earlier panic washout):

“The man who is a pessimist about the future of the United States will inevitably go broke.” –J. P. Morgan

With all the optimism we have for America (reason enough we were totally ticked at a Tuesday comment suggesting America need not be #1, and stated to kids no less, by Obama’s “Science Czar,” who used to write for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and who some recall had dubious relationships with questionable participants of the original Manhattan Project, inferred if not accused of leaking information to the Soviets with respect to design attributes of America’s first atomic bomb), we have to at this point view the stock market’s ebullience as a temporary form of what’s called “white noise.”

We are less concerned (because it was a given that some recovery was underway, of course, given the money thrown at this, even if misdirected) about short-term results, than we are about a long-term “vision” for the Nation, given the debt constraints, and that remains troubling irrespective of a “controlled” equity advance that’s on fumes, of course (written earlier last week). To believe there is no price to be paid for the debt future generations are encumbered with is to believe in fairy tales, and to assume the “new normal” is over as we return to “business as usual” (more on this follows).

Absolutely terrific moves have occurred in stocks, and though we can lament being a bit reluctant to embrace a lot of it despite knowing “the fix was in” since forecasting a turn back up in February of 2009 when everyone was panicking (though we’ve never had a short in equities this whole time, only long mostly energy and oil plus sprinkling of speculations, including Ford and financials back then, but certainly not extended at this time); it seems foolhardy to commit to big-cap stocks ahead of what forthcoming woes may lie ahead. Some of those will be fear-based; others will be very realistic.

At the same time we suspected roughly mid-April would become a more dangerous, or contested, time in the market, for a number of technical and fundamental reasons. Earnings generally should be good, but that was anticipated and is discounted. Thus those buying into strength following good reports generally will regret it quite quickly (sometimes within hours). This is a very complex market, and it is professionally handled we’ve argued for months. That’s for sure why it “ground” higher; it’s why the volume is light on the rallies; it’s also why there is no incentive nor expectation for sidelined cash to suddenly emerge onto the scene. And yes, as the pieces of this puzzle again have a chance to come together -once it’s breaking- these factors and others will be cited for reasons for the upcoming declines (written last Tuesday).

If our cynicism is valid, then what is occurring is not unique among economic events of historical significance. It’s part of the reality where economics are bred to ignore at least a lot of real world concerns, and central bankers (or regulators?) are rewarded in a sense, by turning the other cheek (and that means not doing their jobs in time).

At this point they do more transparently discuss what caused the crisis (after millions of dollars spent, they arrive at the triggers which we outlined as projections before the whole “epic debacle” mess commenced), while failing to realize (or admit) that overall leverage is worse today than ahead of (reserved comparison for our members only).

In fairness, every crisis we’ve seen (LTCM, the S&L crisis, what have you) has had a contributing element of “extend and pretend” to the politics of it (where they mask the regulatory or pressured political environment that both stimulated the misdeeds and a failing to then regulate decently until obviously it was past the point of being useful). It was sort of (and remains today) a “see no evil, speak no evil, hear no evil,” as even at this juncture essentially remains the “modus operandi.” If it were now, how come all of these “experts” who now understand what got us here fail to realize we’re still there in terms of leveraged debt and unwound structured derivatives? Primary difference is that American taxpayers (plus kids and grandkids) are on the hook this time around.

The foregoing may not seem to tie into short-term prospects for the market to break it may seem, but actually, it does. Prices are too far ahead of themselves given reality; a running out of cash (the market gas) may be concurrent before state & local failures hit soon; delinquencies and failures (not to mention foreclosures) will rise anew rather than diminish; irrespective of proclamations to the contrary based on wishful thinking.

Finally, despite paring-down the differential between revenues and outlays as was in fact reported by the CBO, a glance at cash suggests Treasury is down to just 9 (for members), which is pretty frightening itself (redacted), regardless of coupons issued and pending settlement. All this focuses my point about shorter durations (redacted).

The bond market hasn’t called equities “bluff” quite yet; but bond managers are hiding in stocks, because of the risk on their traditional side of the ledger. Intriguing indeed if you view that from the perspective of a desperate effort to diversify, but into extended sectors on their own (with respect particularly to the big-caps). Caveat emptor indeed, we say, as the tune’s gradually trying to shift from simply “the band played on” mode.

In my view, we love the animal spirits of American growth but believe lots of that has been throttled by misdirection of funds and special interest support, not citizen help if warranted (meaning not money on a silver platter, but logical small business help that has been mostly lip-service rather than well-directed stimulus). The Fed Chairman is right when he says we’re not out of the woods by a long shot, as I’ve been warning.
We thought the market would try one more time after Easter and it did, but then could easily see flailing and faltering (after these failing) rallies as time evolves quite soon.

Going forward, we again warn about being exhorted to chased rebound rallies as will be cheered-on, not to mention major “commercial” adjustments as are ongoing, along with a careful focus on monetary changes just beneath the radar (so far). And as I’ve said, there were fairly visible new storm clouds gathering, while a primary disturbance is still just offshore, shall we say.

This is our second contribution to the “Mad Money” blog, and we’re delighted to participate in this progressive social media website with its unique approach. We’ll strive to provide a brief comment on a regular basis, as this very complex investment scene evolves.

Gene Inger,
Publisher

ingerletter.com